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(Gordon Stewart)

Early Retirement

Early retirement is the benefit that will do the most to improve the clandestine services. It will help hold the average age down, it will speed up promotions, it will permit a larger intake of young officers and it will reward individuals for years of service overseas.

Ideally the clandestine services should be able to retire any officer who has served twenty years and has reached the age of 50 by certifying that such action is in the interest of the United States. If it is not possible to obtain legislation this broad, I would strongly urge that we narrow it down by stipulating that the clandestine services will not retire more than X number of officers each year. Under this system retirement would neither be a right nor would it be entirely voluntary. It would, however, be an effective tool of management and that is what is most badly needed at present.

As time goes on and as the bumps and lumps have been worked out of our system, it could logically be construed as being in the interest of the United States to offer early retirement routinely to those officers who have served long periods of time overseas. This would add a voluntary aspect to the administration of early retirement and emphasis would shift slightly from the needs of the Agency to the desires of the individual; or perhaps to put it more exactly, the two would become more compatible.

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High Salaries

The take-home pay of a GS-18 at the present time is less in terms of goods and services than that of a GS-15 during the 30's and most of the 40's. The gradual decline in the value of government pay is very disturbing when one considers the effect this is having on the Federal service. It is to be hoped that this administration will face up to its responsibilities in this area. Short of a large-scale revision of pay schedules, there is little that we can do to improve the material circumstances of officers now in the supergrades. An increase in the top salary paid to \$19,500. or \$20,000. will place us in a more competitive position with respect to the Foreign Service and will be a great help in recruiting. But it will not have much effect on anyone's way of life. The great advantages in salary and other forms of income and service enjoyed by military brass are plainly out of reach, short of a general revision of pay schedules.

With regard to the number of supergrade positions, I would strongly caution against creation at one time of a large number of additional slots. Expansion should be slow and continuous over a period of years. At the moment I believe we have too few grade 16 and 17 positions. My Division, for example, needs three grade 16 openings, or at the most four. If these were granted, we would probably ask for one or two more in a year or so, but not sooner.

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Public Status and Prestige

In developing special and unique careers for clandestine service officers we would be flying under false colors if we were to suggest that these officers could look forward to occupying positions of public status and prestige at the end of their careers with this Agency. We must appeal to men on the basis of the intrinsic value of the service that they can render and the great personal rewards that come from participating in the exercise of power that the clandestine services can bring to bear in world events. At the same time I feel that we should encourage certain of our people to seek to move on to conspicuous positions in government, business, and the professions, and that we should stay in touch with these individuals. Ideally the clandestine services should enjoy the reputation of being a good organization to be with and also a good organization to be from. This is a sign of health in any enterprise. It is not, however, part of a career program.

A Separate Corps

I doubt very much that we should at this time attempt to separate out the highly motivated and overseas-prone officers in grades 15 and below and constitute them into an overseas operations corps. This is not to say that our discussions of this subject have been unproductive. In rather general terms we have

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sketched out the type of a corps that might well be instituted slowly over a period of years. The concept that an officer be promoted more or less automatically during the first few years of service (apprenticeship and training), that he then be subjected to a period of testing and that at some stage after he has been promoted to grade 12 he either be selected into a corps or told that his career lies elsewhere within or outside of the service is, in my opinion, basically sound. I would associate selection very closely with the decision to send a man overseas on his second or third tour because we should not allow a situation to arise in which an officer is considered to be good enough to serve overseas on repeated tours but is not good enough to enter the corps. I would suggest furthermore that an accounting procedure be established which would show in aggregate the amount of time served overseas by members of the corps and the amount of time served at headquarters. These figures would be valuable in expanding or defending the granting of benefits to corps members. By having them available we might furthermore be able to administer the corps objectively without having to pay too much attention to the number of years of overseas service of any particular officer. I feel it is most necessary that we not be placed in a position in which in order to grant benefits to a particular person we are forced against judgment to assign that person overseas.

I would suggest that in forming the corps we begin with the oldest JOT and that we take people at his age and younger under

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examination as potential members of the corps. I feel this selection should be based on service rather than on "evidences" of motivation or lack thereof. Our experience with the Agency's career service proved to me that efforts to distinguish between individuals in terms of motivation result in an absolutely banal type of exercise.

I would furthermore suggest that we, in fact, select the members of the "corps" and carefully study the problems created by separating off this group before we publicly identify the group. In making this proposal I foresee the possibility that we may not wish to go ahead with the corps after we have sized it up in practical and concrete terms. There is, in my opinion, a very strong possibility that a separate corps would be more trouble than it is worth. It might draw false distinctions between people and it might tend to limit and narrow the operational direction the clandestine services will take in the future. There is no doubt the group of officers selected into the Foreign Service of the State Department have exerted an extremely conservative influence on the Department. Whether this Agency can afford to have such a group is a philosophical question at least worth careful consideration.

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